On The Brink
History and present trends suggest militarism is in decline,
but it remains a dangerous presence
by Robert Gilman
One of the articles in Is Militarism Fading? (IC#20) Winter 1989, Page 12
Copyright (c)1989, 1997 by Context Institute
| To order this issue ...
There has been a lot of good news in the past year or so - from the
INF treaty, to the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, even to talk of ending
the Cold War. But does this really mean that peace is breaking out? The
world is full of conflicting signals. For example, world-wide military spending
is at an all time high of almost $1 trillion and 1987 marked an all time
high in the number of active wars. You could use today's headlines to argue
either way, that militarism is fading or gaining.
To get a better understanding, and to find out where the long term trends
are heading, we will have to go much deeper than the headlines.
WHAT IS MILITARISM?
Militarism is a complex cultural pattern involving an entire constellation
of beliefs, behaviors, institutions and supporting conditions. Its starting
point is the belief that force rules. Militarism applies this belief to
intergroup relations, whether between groups within a society or between
societies. The enthusiastic militarist says that the rule of force is legitimate,
either because God or history is on his side or simply because he is strong.
The reluctant militarist bemoans the rule of force but claims there is no
other way.
Yet there is more to militarism than just the use of force. To get at
this larger whole it will help to go back to how militarism began. Conflict
has undoubtedly always been part of the human condition, as has physical
combat. Militarism, however, is a fairly recent invention that first developed
about 5000 to 6000 years ago. You may remember (see IC #12) that
up until about 10,000 years ago, all human groups were tribal hunters and
gatherers. Then, starting in the Middle East, people began to evolve gathering
into gardening, and more slowly, hunting into herding. Eventually a more
settled existence began to develop for the gardeners, and with it the development
of towns and the elaboration of various crafts. One of the striking characteristics
of early agricultural towns (e.g. Catal Huyuk, an 8000 year old town in
Turkey) is that they show no signs of defenses or warfare. It was, in that
sense, a golden age.
But it didn't last. At some point the growing wealth and diversity of
the first agricultural societies made possible two inventions: banditry
and bureaucracy. It is unlikely we will ever know just how banditry began,
but a plausible scenario goes like this: The start of agriculture did not
mean the end of hunting. Both within agricultural communities and in surrounding
nonagricultural cultures, hunting continued to be an important activity.
Over time, however, as agriculture brought on a human population explosion,
game grew scarcer and the role of hunting diminished. Cultures still based
on hunting had to move into more remote territories, and the hunters in
the farming communities became fewer and less important.
Under this stress, someone with the kind of skills that hunting requires
figured out that it would be easier to hunt people (or rather their wealth)
than animals. Intergroup stealing had certainly gone on for ritual and symbolic
purposes between hunting and gathering tribes, as we know from more recent
tribal groups, but it took agriculture to make theft a viable economic
strategy, for one of the big differences between agriculture and hunting
and gathering is that agriculture produces storable and therefore
stealable wealth. Eventually, some clever bandit decided that it
would be even easier to herd people rather than hunt them, so he and his
assistants set themselves up as rulers of their prey. This was the beginning
of militarism; but for it to really flower, it needed another step.
Unlike banditry, which developed at the edge of the new agricultural
civilization, bureaucracy grew out of its center. The social organization
of the first communities appears to have been just as tribal as the hunting
and gathering groups they developed from. But with time and population growth,
the life of these communities grew more complex than the old tribal systems
could handle. Specialized systems of organization and governance were both
supportable and needed, and bureaucracy was the result. The priesthood was
probably the first to develop this social invention since they had the most
free time and talent, and the loosest ties to kinship systems. The first
true cities appear to have been governed by priesthoods that had figured
out how to go beyond the organizational limits of the tribe.
What happens when you mix banditry and bureaucracy? You get the military.
You get a human organization that can be much larger and more flexible than
kinship systems would permit, and that is devoted to the principle that
force rules.
You also get an activity that can exploit some powerful psychological
drives and patterns - the urge to compensate for a sense of weakness by
dominating someone else, and the urge to shield yourself from your own dark
side by creating an image of "the enemy" who is the embodiment
of evil.
Militarism is thus based on three components: its belief that the use
of force is legitimate, its economic ability to concentrate wealth, and
its role as an outlet for deep psychological forces.
With the blending of these factors, history starts to be dominated by
the warlord and his unabashed militarism. His goal is simple: to conquer
and dominate by force as much as he can, to use the military as the basic
means for gaining both wealth from and power over other people.
The tragedy of the warlord's emergence on the world stage, as Andrew
Schmookler pointed out in The Parable of The Tribes (see IC #7
and his article in this issue), is that once one warlord succeeds, all surrounding
groups are forced to either learn the ways of war to defend themselves or
face being conquered. Soon the only players left are those who, enthusiastically
or reluctantly, have adopted militarism as their fundamental strategy for
intergroup relations.
This pattern has held sway up to the present time. It has been expressed
in myriad forms by myriad cultures. Sometimes the driving force has been
a single individual (like Alexander the Great), sometimes a ruling class
and sometimes a whole people. Sometimes the goal has been unabashedly economic
and sometimes it has been to impose a set of beliefs on the conquered. But
these variations don't matter here for they are all militarism. The 19th-century
expansion of the United States over the Native Americans and Mexico, the
colonial empires of various European powers, the aggressive expansions of
the Nazis and the Japanese in World War II, the Soviet takeover of Eastern
Europe - all are expressions of the same cultural pattern.
Throughout its strong and persistent history, militarism has influenced
almost every aspect of civilized culture. Most of the world's great religions
(especially the Judeo-Christian, Islamic and Hindu traditions) envision
God as the "great warlord in the sky:" an absolute monarch involved
in a great battle against enemies against whom he is willing to use violence.
The family is spoken of as a little kingdom with the father expected to
be the (hopefully benevolent) ruler. Many modern corporations and government
agencies are set up like feudal empires.
THE TRENDS AGAINST IT
Fortunately, even as central as it has been, militarism is not the whole
story of civilization. There are other important cultural patterns, some
old, some recent, that provide alternatives and opposition, and that increasingly
are now undermining the foundations on which militarism is built.
The Rule Of Wisdom and Law * The oldest alternative to militarism
is the idea that fairness and wisdom are better than force. When tribal
societies needed to make group decisions or resolve some conflict, they
would often turn to their elders, whose wisdom and experience was respected.
This reflects an ancient tradition, much older than militarism, that
disputes should be decided on their merits on the basis of commonly held
principles. The little evidence that is available suggests that before the
rise of militarism this approach was the norm for relations between tribes
as well as within them. This tradition provides the ideals behind the rule
of law.
It is important to note that, even in its ideal form, the rule of law
is willing to use force. But it reserves the use of force for one purpose
only: to prevent force from violating or circumventing due process. Thus
the ideal role of the police is to apprehend those accused of violating
laws, but neither to judge nor hurt them. The final decision, in all cases,
must be made on the basis of merits and not through a test of strength.
In the past few centuries, with the development of western democracies,
the rule of law has been applied to larger groups of people and with increasing
care. There is much in the present system that is imperfect, but it is vastly
superior to the anarchy that prevails between nations. While many
have dreamt of applying the rule of law between nations, no one has yet
found a way to make it work.
Ethics And Religious Values * The rule of law is a social and
institutional alternative to the rule of force. Related to it is a more
personal opposition to the rule of force that is, again, undoubtedly very
old. During the first few thousand years of the reign of militarism this
ethical opposition got little support from the religions of the day. Many
of the gods in the Near Eastern, European and Central Asian traditions behaved
in ways that we would surely call immoral, selfish, militaristic, and even
bloodthirsty. Other religions emphasized justice, but with a stern edge
and with clear distinctions between in-groups and out-groups. Yet eventually
the ethical opposition to militarism gained a major boost with the development
of Christianity and Buddhism since both placed great stress on the importance
of applying love, forgiveness, mercy and compassion to all beings.
Unfortunately, the past two thousand years clearly demonstrate that this
message has not gotten through very well, even to those who claim to be
followers of these religions.
Post-agricultural Economies * For most of the past 5000 years
militarism has thrived because it was a successful strategy for concentrating
wealth. Militarism developed in societies whose people and economy were
overwhelmingly agricultural, typically more than 90%. Pre-industrial agriculture
is one of the few major economic activities that can be successfully run
with slave or serf labor. The work is essentially physical, unspecialized
and requires little communication with the larger world. It is easy to keep
the work force politically divided and to replace any that starve or are
slaughtered.
Early industrialism was almost as bad, but as economies have gradually
become more specialized, with a more complex division of labor, the potential
role for essentially slave labor has greatly diminished. Today a modern
economy requires large numbers of people:
- who are extensively educated and not easily replaced;
- who are in frequent communication with others;
- who must take initiative and do high quality work.
The experience of the past few decades has made it very clear, even to
totalitarian governments like those in China and the Soviet Union, that
internal militarism (as in the Chinese Cultural Revolution) is a disaster
for such a modern economy.
The modern economy has also made possible new strategies for concentrating
wealth (like industrialism and the banking system) and controlling the masses
(like manipulative public relations). The success of these alternatives
has made militarism less essential to those in power.
In addition, industrial economies, because of all the complex interconnected
systems they depend on, are much easier to destroy and much harder to rebuild
than agricultural economies. At the same time, modern technology has produced
weapons, both nuclear and conventional, that are much more destructive than
the sword and the spear. (The increased destructiveness and viciousness
of modern warfare is emphasized by the steady increase in the civilian proportion
of war-related deaths: about 50% up through the 1960s, 73% in the 70s, and
so far 85% in the 80s [Sivard, p. 28].) As a result, modern economies have
much to lose and little to gain in economic terms by waging war with
each other. They are in fact so vulnerable that they have to be seriously
concerned about attacks from tiny groups of terrorists.
THE PRESENT SITUATION
Since World War II, the economic and technological trends undermining
militarism have been accelerating. As a result, no major country has been
able to gain substantial wealth through military conquest. The chances of
even winning a war that you start (much less gaining from it) have been
declining, with starters having won only 39% of the wars during the 20th
century and only 11% so far in the 1980s.
All of the economic success stories (such as Europe, Japan, Korea, and
even lately China) have come from investing in the economy, not the military.
Internally, both economic success (as in Korea and Taiwan) and failure (as
in China and the USSR) have led to a loosening of authoritarian and totalitarian
control.
As an expression of these trends, warfare has changed its focus. From
1700 through 1945, most wars and war deaths were direct conflicts between
major powers and took place in Europe. Since 1945, there have been no direct
military conflicts between major powers. Nuclear weapons and vulnerable
societies have made it too dangerous.
Even great power/small power conflicts, like Vietnam and Afghanistan,
have provided powerful examples of the failure of modern militarism. In
both cases, massive force from a military superpower was not able to produce
victory. In this sense, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are now finally catching
up to the Europeans, whose colonialism began waning even before World War
II because it simply wasn't worth the costs.
In recent decades essentially all wars have been in the Third World.
Most of these wars have been in agricultural societies and 70% have pitted
artificially created post-colonial central governments against indigenous
cultures who live within the old colonial boundaries and want their own
independence. The superpowers have exacerbated these conflicts, but our
self-important obsession with East-West rivalry has blinded us to the underlying
fact that most of these Third World wars are simply preindustrial empire
building by one ethnic group over others. If they wanted to, the industrialized
countries could vastly reduce this Third World violence.
BUT IT'S NOT OVER YET...
The broad-scale trends are very hopeful. The history of the 20th century
shows that militarism doesn't pay, and if present economic trends continue
it will become even more of a liability. Its crucial practical justification
is gone. If history were a smooth progression and if people and governments
always behaved rationally, we could confidently proclaim militarism dead.
Unfortunately, neither history nor humans are that reliable. The world
today is in a very fragile state (see IC
#19). The natural environment is under great stress and growing less
supportive of human activity. Economies all over the world are in shaky
conditions. Many of today's youth around the world are growing up in brutalizing
conditions. In the industrialized countries, and especially in the U.S.,
many people are afraid of the future and resistant to change. All of this
social and psychological fragileness is embedded in a world society that
is armed to the teeth and is saturated with images and stories that glamorize
the "righteous" use of force. The danger of a psychotic outburst
of militarism is very great.
The world is now like the victim of a great trauma who must find the
psychological way back to normalcy even after the "objective"
danger has passed. The articles that follow explore how we can return to
sanity by such routes as developing alternative defense policies and redirecting
the energy of the warrior. We hope you will find them healing and useful.
The next few decades could bring militarism to an end as fully as
slavery ended over a century ago. But it won't happen unless we are now
willing, with courage, creativity and compassion, to act.
REFERENCES
World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88, Ruth Leger Sivard,
World Priorities, Box 25140, Washington, DC 20007.
"Third World War: The global conflict over the rights of indigenous
nations," Bernard Nietschmann, Cultural Survival Quarterly,
Sept 1987, 11 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138.
Please support
this web site ... and thanks if you already are!
All contents copyright (c)1989,
1997 by Context Institute
Please send comments to webmaster
Last Updated 29 June 2000.
URL: http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC20/Gilman.htm
Home | Search
| Index of Issues | Table
of Contents
|